

30 DEC 1970

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

30 DECEMBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 52)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 21 - 27 DECEMBER 1970

Moscow (3583 items)

Polish Events	(--)	15%
Indochina	(19%)	10%
[NFLSV Anniver-	(8%)	5%]
sary		
[VPA Anniversary	(--)	1%]
UAR Vice President	(1%)	6%
Sabri in USSR		
China	(4%)	5%
Luna 17 and Lunakhod	(5%)	3%
Angela Davis Case	(4%)	3%
Basque Case	(3%)	1%

Peking (2752 items)

Indochina	(60%)	41%
[NFLSV Anniversary	(12%)	25%]
[VPA Anniversary	(--)	10%]
Domestic Issues	(24%)	29%
Polish Events	(--)	13%
Okirawa Events	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi propaganda continues to claim that "threats" of air strikes against the DRV--most recently repeated by Secretary Rogers in his 23 December press conference--show that the United States is bent on a military victory, not a negotiated settlement. Along with these claims, propagandists repeat the standard line that the PRG proposals at Paris provide a proper basis for settlement but that if necessary the Vietnamese will persevere in the struggle. In this connection there is continuing attention to the 10 December DRV Party-Government appeal, and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 28th stresses improved "security and order" and calls for heightened vigilance.

The United States is again accused of waging a "propaganda campaign" on the prisoner-of-war issue. And in the wake of Hanoi's release of its "complete" list of U.S. POW's on the 22d there is a flurry of propaganda seeking to demonstrate that it is the allies, not the DRV, who mistreat prisoners. Both Hanoi and the Front say again that if the United States were genuinely concerned about the POW's, it would respond to the PRG call for U.S. agreement to withdraw troops by the end of next June, after which talks could be held on releasing prisoners.

Soviet media promptly reported Secretary Rogers' press conference "threats" against the DRV, but there is no followup comment. Assaults on U.S. policy include a 27 December PRAVDA interview with DRV Paris delegate Xuan Thuy, who calls the Administration's policy a "blatant provocation" and thanks the USSR for its support as expressed in the 16 December government statement on the DRV appeal.

Chinese promises of "all-out support" are reaffirmed in propaganda on the provincial tour of the NFLSV delegation which came to China to celebrate the Front's 20 December 10th anniversary. The Chinese speaker at a Shanghai banquet, decrying U.S. "wild bombing and war clamor," echoed the 13 December Chinese Party-Government statement on the DRV appeal in asserting that provocations against the Vietnamese are provocations against the Chinese. (A NHAN DAN editorial on the 24th typifies Hanoi's even-handed treatment when it juxtaposes references to Moscow's and Peking's official statements in a roundup of support for the DRV appeal.)

HANOI ASSAILS ROGERS' REMARKS ON POW LIST, "THREATS" TO DRV

Secretary Rogers' 23 December press conference prompts a statement the next day by the DRV spokesman in Paris, released by Hanoi radio and press media on the 26th, and a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 27th, reviewed by VNA in English and Vietnamese.

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The Paris spokesman takes issue with the Secretary's characterization of Hanoi's release of the list of U.S. prisoners as a "contemptible, barbarous, and inhuman maneuver," and he counters that it is the United States which is "barbarous" in its bombings of the DRV. Ignoring Rogers' assertion that the list of names was not new, the spokesman says that "a full list" was supplied in compliance with requests of Senators Kennedy, Fulbright, and McGovern and the committee for liaison with families of prisoners. He adds that Hanoi had once more "underlined" the DRV's "humane policy" toward the prisoners, despite its reservation on Article 85 of the Geneva convention on the POW issue--a point made in the 23 December DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the list and in the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the same day. The 27 December NHAN DAN Commentator article, as reviewed by VNA in Vietnamese the next day, observes only that Rogers "made the slanderous charge of 'inhuman' treatment of prisoners, said the release of the prisoners' list is a 'propaganda maneuver,' and repeated the so-called proposal for POW exchanges."

The DRV spokesman, without noting the Secretary's discussion of the President's 10 December exposition on U.S. justification for extending the bombings to North Vietnam, says only that the President's 10 December declaration and those by Rogers on the 23d "once more exposed the United States' hostile, provocative, and bellicose policy"--a policy of "continuous acts of war" against the DRV and "multiplied threats to intensify them." Commentator recalls that the President in his "arrogant" claims on the 10th had also said he would order air strikes against the DRV to protect U.S. bombing missions in Laos and that he would order attacks not only on anti-aircraft sites but on other military installations and supply routes.

Both the DRV spokesman's statement and the Commentator article deprecate the President's 7 October five-point proposal, saying that the Vietnamese people have "completely rejected" it. There is no explicit mention of Rogers' remark that the communists are using the Paris talks only for propaganda purposes, but the DRV spokesman voices the counter argument that "the Nixon Administration is hindering more and more the work of the Paris conference and threatening to sabotage it." And the DRV spokesman seems indirectly to acknowledge Rogers' remark that if the communists want to talk seriously they should do so in private sessions when he says that "the form of the conference, whether public or private, enlarged or restricted, does not matter."

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TREATMENT OF POW'S STRESSED, RELEASE OF "DRV" POW'S DEPRECATED

Hanoi's release of the list of U.S. prisoners is not mentioned explicitly in available propaganda other than the items on Secretary Rogers' press conference. Thus, VNA's account of the 96th session of the Paris talks on 23 December does not mention the list in observing that the allied delegates "were concerned to counter the positive effects on public opinion" by the letters sent by President Ton Duc Thang, Premier Pham Van Dong, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to U.S. Senators and the liaison committee which "made clear the humanitarian DRV policy toward the captured U.S. pilots."

Other scattered items also stress the "humane" treatment given the American prisoners, such as a VNA and Hanoi radio report of a U.S. delegation which visited a POW camp and delivered mail from prisoners' families, and was received by Pham Van Dong. Another VNA item claims that U.S. charges of mistreatment of U.S. POW's "is but a vile pretext for taking adventurous acts" against the DRV.

The interview with American prisoners filmed by a Canadian correspondent which was shown on U.S. television on the 27th is reported in a Hanoi English-language broadcast to servicemen in South Vietnam on the 29th. The same transmission on the 27th quoted one of the same prisoners in the course of describing a Christmas Eve service at a U.S. POW camp.

MISTREATMENT OF POW'S BY ALLIES Condemnation of alleged mistreatment of prisoners in South Vietnam is voiced in statements by spokesmen of the PRG and the DRV Foreign Ministry on the 23d and 29th, respectively. The PRG spokesman charges the United States with numerous generalized crimes such as bombings and the use of toxic chemicals, as well as the mistreatment of prisoners--including those "who advocate peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy in South Vietnam." The statement claims that the Nixon Administration "threatens, persecutes, and even disposes of the GI's released by the PLAF in order to keep them from speaking out the truth on the humanitarian and lenient policy of the NFLSV and PRG." It says that the U.S. "crimes" have exposed the "trickery" in demanding implementation of the Geneva conventions on humane treatment, and it appeals broadly for government and popular pressure to condemn the allied actions in order to insure the life and "the immediate and unconditional release of all detained patriots."

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The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement gives "full support" to the PRG statement and echoes its demand regarding the release of prisoners. It says that despite U.S. and GVN efforts "to conceal their crimes," "concrete evidences" of mistreatment in allied prisons have been brought forward by such sources as the Saigon press, "a number of personalities in the so-called National Assembly in Saigon," and several U.S. newsmen and "political workers" who had been to South Vietnam. The spokesman claims that the U.S.-GVN's "repressive policy has unmasked the true nature of the Nixon Administration's allegations about its 'respect' for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination."

A 24 December Liberation Radio commentary on allied mistreatment of prisoners goes beyond the spokesmen's statements when it notes the U.S. proposal for an immediate discussion of the release of POW's and says that the captured U.S. personnel cannot be put on an equal plane with "Vietnamese patriots and people" since the United States is the aggressor. It adds that the detention of "our patriots and compatriots" is completely illegal and thus they must be released: "There is no question of exchange of POW's as the Nixon Administration has pretended." However, in an earlier passage on the humanitarian policy of the DRV and the Front, the commentary says cryptically that "with respect to those who repent of their past crimes, they can soon be returned to their families."

RELEASE OF "DRV" POW'S The 22 December GVN announcement that 50 sick and disabled North Vietnamese prisoners would be released on the occasion of Tet brought a prompt statement by a PRG spokesman on the 23d.* And on the 24th a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement noted that the PRG statement had "unmasked this evil trick" and stressed the "inalienable sacred right" of any citizen to fight against the United States and "its henchmen."

The DRV statement, like propaganda on past prisoner releases, says that if any of the released "patriots" wish to come and live in the North, they will be received and helped by the DRV Government. The VNA account of the Paris session cryptically notes that the GVN release was raised there, saying only: "The U.S. and Saigon puppets' representatives also played a trick on the release of a number of 'disabled North Vietnamese prisoners of war' on the occasion of the lunar New Year's festival."

* See the TRENDS of 23 December 1970, pages 5-6.

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There is no other available Hanoi propaganda on the release, but a Liberation Radio commentary on the 25th notes that at the same time the announcement on the release of prisoners was made the GVN "shamelessly made public a White Book repeating the fabricated and absurd talk about the so-called 'aggression of the North against the South.'" The commentary then goes on at length to argue that the Vietnamese have the right to fight the "aggressor" anywhere in the country--a theme prominent in 1968 when the United States was stressing the VPA presence in the South and pressing for a mutual troop withdrawal. The commentary also makes an ambiguous reference to the allied offer at Paris on 10 December for an exchange of prisoners to mark the holidays: It says that the GVN "also intends to use 8,000 South Vietnamese people whom it is illegally detaining in exchange for U.S. pilots." Rejecting the notion of an exchange, it recalls that the PRG's eight points provide for immediate discussion of release of prisoners if the United States agrees to withdraw by 30 June.

MEAGER MOSCOW ATTENTION TO POW ISSUE, ROGERS PRESS CONFERENCE

PRISONER TASS on 23 December reports the DRV Foreign Ministry
ISSUE spokesman's statement announcing the release of a list of "all" American pilots captured in the North, and on the 28th reports that the film of an interview with two of the captured pilots was shown on U.S. television. On the 25th TASS reports the statement by the PRG spokesman condemning brutal treatment of imprisoned "South Vietnamese patriots," but Moscow is not known to have reported either the 23 December PRG Interior Ministry statement or the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 24th scoring the GVN announcement that it would release 50 disabled North Vietnamese prisoners for Tet.

There is little Moscow followup comment on the prisoner issue. But a 26 December TASS commentary by Kharkov points to U.S. "displeasure" with Hanoi's "humane act" of releasing the list, saying that the Americans have been using the prisoner issue as a cover for continued "occupation" of South Vietnam. Kharkov says that in an attempt to "belittle" the DRV's action, people in Washington "alleged that they already had a list" of prisoners--a point ignored by Hanoi. An IZVESTIYA commentary by Ilinskiy on the 27th briefly refers to the DRV's list and says that Washington is trying to "justify" the bombings of the DRV and plans for "extending aggression" in Indochina by raising a "propaganda fuss" about the prisoners. The United States, says Ilinskiy,

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is trying to equate the American air pirates with the arrested "patriots" in South Vietnam, and he briefly cites the 23 December NHAN DAN Commentator article which demanded that the United States free all captured South Vietnamese patriots and scored the U.S. suggestion of an "exchange of prisoners."

ROGERS PRESS TASS on 23 December, in a dispatch published in
CONFERENCE PRAVDA the next day, briefly reports Secretary Rogers' press conference, noting that he "confirmed" the U.S. intention to continue "aggression" in Vietnam. TASS says that he repeated President Nixon's statement that bombings will be ordered on DRV military targets, bases, and communication lines "if the security of American troops in South Vietnam is threatened," and that he said reconnaissance flights would be continued. TASS also says that Rogers held the PRG and the DRV responsible for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement, and that he "ignored" their peace proposals, saying that they contain "no new elements and are designed as propaganda." The account, however, ignores his comments on the "understandings" leading up to the bombing halt, comments which included references to the Soviet role. It also fails to report Rogers' statement that the DRV release of the list of prisoners is a "contemptible maneuver."

There is no available Moscow followup comment on the press conference. TASS does briefly report the statement by the DRV Paris spokesman and the 27 December NHAN DAN article, but includes neither the spokesman's refutation of Rogers' comments on the prisoner list nor references to the bombing-halt "understanding."

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MIDDLE EAST

JOINT COMMUNIQUE CONCLUDES 'ALI SABRI TALKS IN MOSCOW

The communique on the 20-26 December visit to Moscow of a UAR party-government delegation led by Vice President 'Ali Sabri* routinely reiterates positions stated in past Soviet-UAR communiques on the Middle East and bilateral relations. It also says that international issues were discussed and a "coincidence of views" was "noted again." As in the case of the much longer communique on Nasir's last visit to Moscow this past July, it says the talks were held in an atmosphere of "friendship and full mutual understanding" and that the sides expressed satisfaction with the state of UAR-Soviet relations. The Soviet side, declaring its support for UAR efforts for "progressive development" and strengthening its independence and sovereignty, routinely pledged further "aid and support" for the Arab peoples in their struggle for liberation of the occupied territories and the establishment of a just peace.

The communique says a "full coincidence of views" was noted with regard to the danger of continuation of the present situation in the Middle East stemming from Israel's efforts to continue its occupation of Arab territories. And the communique parallels the language of the July communique on Nasir's visit in its denunciation of Israel's U.S.-supported "aggressive expansionist policy." As in the July communique, the current one expresses the sides' "firm confidence" that the only way to achieve a fair and lasting peace in the Middle East is by full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, and implementation of UN resolutions concerning the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people.

PEACE In comparison with past UAR-Soviet communiques, one
EFFORTS slight modification does appear this time in the formula on both sides' support for efforts "within and outside the United Nations" aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement in accordance with Resolution 242. It is unclear precisely to what the phrase refers. The Big Four discussions of course

* 'Ali Sabri's last visit to the USSR--other than as a member of Nasir's delegation this past July--was in July 1969 in his capacity as ASU Supreme Executive Committee member; he had led a UAR party-government delegation to the October Revolution 50th anniversary festivities in 1967.

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are viewed by Moscow as falling within the UN framework; efforts "outside" the United Nations might refer, on the Soviet side, to U.S.-Soviet contacts as well as other bilateral and multilateral consultations and, on the UAR side, to the current Egyptian "political campaign" in which delegations are fanning out in a worldwide effort to explain the Arab viewpoint.

The formula would seem to have stemmed from a Soviet initiative in which the UAR is now joining. Last July, the sides simply confirmed their support for "efforts undertaken in the framework of the United Nations" aimed at a political settlement. But in December 1969 Kosygin employed the phrase "efforts within and outside the United Nations" in a speech during the visit of a UAR party-government delegation led by Anwar as-Sadat. It appeared again in the communique, but on that occasion only the Soviet side declared that it would continue efforts both in and outside the United Nations for a political settlement.* (Gromyko in his September 1969 UNGA address had said the Soviet Union was pursuing a political settlement within the framework of international efforts, including the four-power consultations; a week later, a domestic service roundtable panelist pointed out that Soviet representatives, "both within the framework of international organizations and at constant bilateral and multilateral consultations," had been urging a political settlement.)

JARRING TALKS,
CEASE-FIRE

The Jarring contacts are mentioned only in passing, in the communique's assertion that Israel's policy creates obstacles to his mission.

The communique makes no mention of the cease-fire, a subject to which Moscow has given negligible attention. But Cairo continues to promote its views: A UAR-Yugoslav communique on the 19-26 December visit of a UAR delegation led by Vice President Husayn ash-Shafi'i says that he explained in the talks that the UAR "will not agree to further extension of the cease-fire unless immediate positive steps are taken toward establishment of a permanent and just peace" in the area, and that responsibility for this falls primarily not on Israel but on international society and on the Security Council. According to the communique, Tito expressed his "full endorsement" of "all ash-Shafi'i's explanations."

* See the FBIS TRENDS of 17 December 1969, page 18, for a discussion of the communique on the as-Sadat visit.

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ECONOMIC RELATIONS The communique notes that new agreements on a further development of trade and economic cooperation were achieved during the talks, and the sides agreed on the conclusion of long-term agreements in this field. TASS on the 28th cites Deputy Prime Minister 'Aziz Sidqi, who led the economic discussions in Moscow, as telling the Cairo AL-AHRAM that the foundations of "new forms" of economic and trade cooperation were laid during the talks, in particular the agreement to sign five-year economic and trade agreements. According to AL-AHRAM and MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) reports, a Soviet delegation led by Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev will come to Cairo, then Sidqi will lead a large delegation to Moscow in March, and the final text will be signed in Cairo in June during the visit of a delegation led by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Novikov. AL-AHRAM also noted that Sidqi had signed a number of other agreements in Moscow "which will promote output in a number of important war production projects." And MENA on the 26th cited Sidqi as saying it had been agreed to implement "a number of military production projects" in cooperation with the USSR.

PARTY CONTACTS The communique stresses the "great importance" of CPSU-Arab Socialist Union (ASU) ties and the sides' desire to further develop these relations. In July, the Nasir communique had noted discussion of ways of extending party contacts and agreement to continue the "fruitful and useful practice" of exchanging party delegations. The communique concluding his July 1968 visit to Moscow had also noted the two sides' welcome of the establishment and development of friendly CPSU-ASU contacts. The 20 December communique on the recent visit of a CPSU delegation led by Ponomarev to Cairo devoted several paragraphs to a summary, in general terms, of the party discussions.

A Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 28th hailing the 'Ali Sabri visit praises the "basically new mode of relations" being developed between the "first socialist state in the world and the vanguard of the Arab national liberation movement," and claims that the friendly Soviet-UAR relations have entered a new phase. These relations, it says, are no longer being strengthened and developed only between two states, but also along party lines, and it adds that the UAR is "increasingly resorting to the experience" of the CPSU.

DEFENSE OF UAR-SOVIET RELATIONS The commentary also comes out with one of Moscow's periodic defenses of the nature of Soviet-Arab friendship and another complaint of "imperialist and Zionist" attempts to drive a wedge between

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Moscow and the Arabs, insisting that such efforts have been in vain. Another recent commentary in Arabic, on the 17th, had also defensively rebutted "imperialist propaganda" attempts to cast doubt on Soviet-Arab cooperation, citing President as-Sadat as "categorically denying" efforts to misrepresent Soviet assistance in "strengthening the UAR armed forces." The commentary claimed that "imperialist propaganda" tried to denigrate Arab-Soviet cooperation and ascribe to it "nonexistent aims," and thus certain U.S. newspapers persistently wrote about "imaginary Soviet expansionism" and tried to equate U.S. military aid to the "Israeli aggressors" with Soviet aid to maintain the "defensive strength" of the Arabs. The commentary asserted that unlike the United States, the Soviet Union was not trying to achieve selfish ends. It added that the United States has military bases on Arab territory which the petroleum monopolies try to retain at all cost, "but nobody can say such a thing about the Soviet Union."

TASS on the 28th, briefly reporting UAR President as-Sadat's New York TIMES interview, says that he "refuted the fabrications and all kinds of speculation of Western propaganda" distorting the "friendly nature" of UAR-Soviet relations.

USSR NOTES ISRAELI DECISION ON TALKS, UAR VIEW ON CEASE-FIRE

Moscow in its low volume of comment on the Middle East continues to call for resumption of the Jarring contacts in order to make progress toward a peaceful settlement, but expresses skepticism regarding Israeli motives in returning to the talks. There is as yet no available Moscow report on the 29 December Knesset approval of the Israeli cabinet's decision to return to the talks. But a Kudryavtsev domestic service commentary on the 28th--in what is apparently Moscow's first acknowledgment of the Israeli cabinet decision that day--observes that Israel took the decision unwillingly and that its leaders express doubts as to the success of Jarring's mission. He accuses Israel of aiming at undermining the talks from within by "discrediting" these contacts.

A foreign-language commentary by Chernikov on the 29th affirms Moscow's conviction that the crisis should be settled through talks, but notes that Israel's decision to return to the talks is viewed in Cairo as a maneuver aimed at prolonging the truce in order to continue occupation of the Arab territories. He

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cites UAR President as-Sadat as saying the UAR is ready to make real efforts to implement Security Council Resolution 242 but it rejects maneuvers aimed at continuing the occupation. TASS on the 29th reports without comment remarks by as-Sadat to a WPC delegation visiting Cairo in which the Egyptian president said Israel agreed to the Jarring talks in an effort to bring pressure to prolong the cease-fire agreement for a third time. TASS quotes him as adding that if the UAR sees Israel is sincerely striving for complete implementation of Resolution 242, "we shall do all that is required of us, but we shall not allow any maneuvers aimed at prolonging the occupation of our territories."

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POLAND

PZPR First Secretary Gierak and new Premier Jaroszewicz, in speeches before the Polish Sejm on 23 December, dutifully pledged loyalty to the Soviet Union and stressed the continuity of Polish foreign policy but made it clear that the new regime attaches top priority to curing Poland's economic ills and to broadening the party's base of support--an essential condition, Gierak acknowledged, of successful rule. Indirectly faulting their predecessors for following sterile bureaucratic methods and losing touch with the workers, the new leaders promised economic reforms, consultations with the workers in formulating decisions that affect their vital interests, and efforts to normalize relations with the Catholic Church.

The first original Soviet press appraisal of the Polish events, in a dispatch in PRAVDA the day after the two leaders addressed the Sejm, seems to reflect concern over an increase in the workers' role that might weaken the party's authority. The PRAVDA dispatch portrays the recent disorders purely as violations of public order, with no acknowledgment that they might have been motivated by legitimate grievances. It calls for an increase in party activity to instill discipline and a "socialist attitude" in the people.

GIEREK, JAROSZEWICZ PLEDGE ECONOMIC REFORMS, WORKER CONSULTATIONS

In an effort to quiet discontent and win support for the new leadership, party chief Gierak, in his speech to the Polish parliament as carried by PAP, promised prompt action to cope with the country's "swollen problems" as well as a larger role for workers in the formulation of decisions that affect their interests. While making it clear that the recent price increases would not be rescinded, he sought to lessen their impact by announcing a freeze on most food prices and promising a gradual reduction in the prices of industrial products following an anticipated decrease in production costs. He also announced that the government has allocated "a sum not to exceed seven million zlotys" to increase wages and allowances for low-income families and pensioners.

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Implicitly criticizing the previous regime's lack of communication with the people, Gierek said that the government is faced with "the task of reconstructing and consolidating this indispensable tie of mutual trust which should always link us with the working class . . . a tie without which it is impossible to govern in a socialist state." In this context he informed the parliament that meetings were currently underway between party and state officials with workers' representatives "for the purpose of consultation on concrete proposals on rises in wages, allowances, and pensions." Emphasizing that problems connected with the production of national income and distribution "cannot be solved in a bureaucratic manner," Gierek promised "broad consultations" not only with the working class but with men of science and technology, all representatives of all strata of the population, "in order "to promote mutual trust between the government and the people."

In the portion of his speech nominating Cyrankiewicz as President of the State Council, Gierek seemed to indicate that the deposed Premier's contributions to the party were chiefly historical. After hailing Cyrankiewicz' role in the resistance during World War II and noting that he had promoted the alliance with Moscow and signed the treaties of alliance, Gierek simply added: "I am convinced these services predestine him for the post of President of the Council of State." By contrast, in proposing Jaroszewicz for the premiership, Gierek looked to the future in declaring that the new leadership must concentrate its attention on Poland's internal economic development and on winning workers' support for the regime. The government, he said, "should be headed by a man of great economic as well as political experience, who at the same time is aware of the needs of the working class and the entire working population."--qualities with which Cyrankiewicz, by implication, could not be credited.

A TASS account of the two speeches picked up Gierek's recitation of Cyrankiewicz's accomplishments but made no mention of his praise of Jaroszewicz. It also ignored Gierek's remarks to the effect that problems cannot be solved in a bureaucratic manner and his citation of the need for continuing consultations with the workers and other groups in the solution of urgent problems.

Premier Jaroszewicz's address to the Sejm, as broadcast by Radio Warsaw on the 23d, while focused chiefly on the continuity of Polish foreign policy, also played the theme of the need to solve the country's economic problems and to win the support of the masses. He promised that increased earnings for low-income groups would be followed by an improvement in market supplies,

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including food supplies. He also pledged government efforts to "fully normalize" state relations with the Catholic Church, expressing the hope that the government's efforts would meet with proper understanding among the clergy and laymen.

While giving assurances that the government will continue "to strengthen the role of the central plan," Jaroszewicz announced: "We shall simultaneously create suitable conditions for the creative initiative of workers and organizers for production and technical progress, for making decisions and assuming responsibility for these decisions," while taking into account acknowledged "but carefully considered risks." The latter phrase seemed designed to assure party hardliners and the Soviets, who may view a strengthened workers' role as smacking of Titoite self-management, that this policy will not weaken the party's authority. The TASS account of the speech, playing up Jaroszewicz's reassertions of loyalty to the Soviet Union and the socialist alliance, did not include this passage.

ASSURANCES TO MOSCOW, BONN Using the occasion to stress that there would be no changes in Polish foreign policy, Jaroszewicz offered assurances that his government would "strengthen and enrich" its relations with the socialist states, first and foremost the Soviet Union; that it would "actively support" the convening of a European security conference; and that the policy of promoting rapprochement with West Germany would continue. The coming into force of the Polish-FRG treaty, followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations, would be "an important stage in the regulation" of relations between Poland and West Germany.

Concern that the recent chain of events in Poland might affect Warsaw's relations with West Germany had also seemed registered in Gierek's radio-television address on the 20th. Pledging that Poland would remain "a lasting link" in the socialist community and paying tribute to the tutelage of the Soviet Union, Gierek specified--in his only other direct mention of a foreign country--that efforts to normalize relations with Bonn would continue.

MOSCOW EVINCES CONCERN OVER EROSION OF PARTY AUTHORITY

Soviet concern that the authority of the Polish party may have been weakened by the recent disturbances and an apparent warning to the new leadership not to go too far in instituting reforms to meet workers' demands seems reflected in the first

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original Soviet commentary on the Polish events--a report from Warsaw by Boris Averchenko, published in PRAVDA on the 24th. Entitled "A Lofty Sense of Duty," the article underlines the need for a more active party role in instilling discipline among the masses in the aftermath of what it terms "a serious violation of public order."

While reporting that calm has been restored after the recent difficulties and depicting the Polish people as united around their party, it goes on--in something of a non sequitur--to remark that everything is not "going smoothly." Averchenko notes that party organizations, "whose concerns at the moment are diverse and responsible as never before, are striving to heed the growing activeness of the masses and, by using differing forms of work with people, to persistently instill and develop in them a sense of duty and responsibility to the socialist motherland."

Where the Polish leadership has been stressing the need for increased consultation with the workers to help remove their legitimate grievances, PRAVDA enjoins the Polish party organizations to make "great efforts to improve the style and methods of work in order to resolve the difficulties that have arisen, achieve the cohesion of collectives, struggle against the influence of Western bourgeois propaganda, and instill in people a socialist attitude toward labor, organization, and conscious discipline"

To underline its message, the dispatch quotes a group of Silesian miners as expressing confidence that "nobody will ever manage to undermine the unity of the party and people and shake the working people's faith in the ideals of socialism." It also attributes to the miners an expression of confidence that Poland "will continue along a single road" together with "our friend and ally, the Soviet Union."

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FRG - GDR TALKS

EAST BERLIN REPORTS SECOND BAHR-KOHL MEETING WITHOUT COMMENT

GDR media treated the 23 December meeting between State Secretaries Bahr of the FRG and Kohl of the GDR, the second in the current series of East-West German talks, much as they did the first meeting on 27 November. The East Berlin radio announced on the 16th that Kohl had invited Bahr for the talks in the GDR capital. The brief, two-sentence joint communique on the 23d, carried by ADN, stated only that the two representatives "met for a further talk" and "agreed to continue the exchange of views"--a formula almost identical to that of the communique on the earlier meeting. There is no East German comment. TASS took note of the plan for the meeting on the 16th and of the communique on the 23d, also without comment.

GDR--and Soviet--media have ignored Bahr's press conference after the meeting in which he stated, among other things, that he expected the third meeting with Kohl to take place in January. Bahr declined to respond to a question on whether he and Kohl had discussed the recent harassment of traffic between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. East German and Soviet official statements and commentaries protesting the "illegal" meeting of SPD landtag leaders in West Berlin on 21 December had not directly mentioned the traffic slowdown, referring only to the undefined "consequences" of the SPD meeting, and had contained no suggestion that the plans for the Bahr-Kohl meeting on the 23d might be placed in jeopardy.

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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

PEKING DISCUSSES OCEAN RIGHTS, EAST CHINA SEA RESOURCES

Peking has begun testing new waters--ocean rights and the law of the sea--in its broadening search for common interests among a variety of "small and medium-size" countries in opposition to superpower dominance. Having come out last month in support of Latin American countries' claims to a right to fix their own territorial sea limits, Peking has now provided an account (NCNA, 24 December) of "a head-on struggle" waged at the 25th UNGA session against an effort by "U.S. imperialism and another superpower" to realize "their criminal scheme for dividing and dominating the oceans." As in the propaganda in November supporting Latin American ocean rights, Peking has played on a theme of defense of national independence and sovereignty against encroachments by the superpowers.

Concurrently, Peking has turned to issues of ocean rights in its own area by sharply protesting against plans by the Japanese, Nationalist Chinese, and South Koreans to exploit oil and other resources of the East China Sea continental shelf. While Peking has flatly laid claim in this comment to the disputed Senkakus and other islands in the area, it has avoided explicitly formulating its own position on substantive issues of the law of the sea and ocean rights. In holding its own negotiating cards close to the vest while expressing interest in these issues generally, Peking may be laying the ground for possible future moves to press its claims while seeking leverage to acquire a voice in matters having major political and economic implications. In this connection, Peking has hinted at an interest in participating in international deliberations on questions of the law of the sea.

UNGA SESSION NCNA's 24 December account claimed that "a number" of Latin American, Asian, and African countries opposed the superpowers on questions of ocean rights and exploitation of the seabed. As in Peking's comment in November defending Latin American claims, the account supported the right of countries to determine their territorial sea limits "in accordance with their geographical conditions and geological and biological characteristics as well as the need of a rational use of their own resources." Mentioning various points of disagreement between the superpowers on one side and smaller countries on the other, NCNA noted that a Soviet proposal for treating ocean rights and exploitation of the seabed separately was rejected as an effort to shelve the question of sovereignty over territorial waters in order to permit the superpowers to plunder seabed

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resources; it called the U.S. draft convention on the international seabed "a futile attempt to dominate the oceans" and cited the objection of "a great many countries" to the view that seabed and waters deeper than 200 meters be stipulated as international; and it took note of opposition by Latin American countries, "with the support of the African countries," to U.S. proposals on the date and site for an international conference on the law of the sea.

The account also contained Peking's first comment on the draft treaty on arms control on the seabed, which it said was "concocted in collusion" and was approved by "the UN voting machine under the manipulation of U.S. imperialism and the other super-power."

The NCNA account took note of a statement by the Uruguayan foreign minister on preparations for an international conference of the Latin American, Asian, and African countries "with the same stand on the ocean question." In calling on these countries to "get more united and persist in the struggle," Peking may have been signaling its own interest in participating in such a conference.

EAST CHINA An NCNA dispatch on 3 December labeled plans by
SEA RESOURCES Japan, the ROC, and the ROK to conduct joint
 exploration and exploitation of oil resources
on the East China Sea continental shelf "a serious provocation carried out by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries against the Chinese and Korean people." The dispatch acknowledged the high stakes involved, observing that there "are indeed rich oil, natural gas, and other mineral resources" on the seabed in this area and noting that Japan is "particularly in need of all kinds of strategic materials, especially petroleum," for the "militarization" of its economy. NCNA also took note of the dispute over title to the Senkakus, pointing out that Japan is claiming the Senkakus (Tiaoyu) "and other islands and water areas which belong to China."

An NCNA dispatch on 23 December reacted to the meeting two days earlier of the tripartite Joint Committee for Ocean Development Research formed by the Japan-ROC-ROK Liaison Committee that was established in July. As in the earlier report, this dispatch took exception to the decision to shelve the question of sovereignty over the water areas in order to proceed with joint exploitation of the seabed resources. It also brought in the

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United States as a factor in the dispute, charging that the venture in the East China Sea, "including the islands appertaining to China's Taiwan province," exposes "the vicious intention of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries to squarely challenge the sovereignty" of the PRC.

In the most authoritative comment thus far, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 29 December--also pegged to the 21 December meeting of the joint committee--firmly declares Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan "and the islands appertaining thereto, including the Tiaoyu, Huangwei, Chihwei, Nanhsiao, and Peihhsiao islands." Warning that "we will never permit others to put their fingers" on these areas, Commentator asserts that the PRC alone has the right to exploit the resources of the seabed of these areas and that all agreements with any country concluded by the Chiang Kai-shek regime "are illegal and null and void." Commentator also takes note of Japanese claims to ownership of the Senkakus--a point contested by both Peking and Taipei.

While Peking is on record as claiming a 12-mile territorial sea limit (in the PRC Government declaration of 4 September 1958), it has not taken the occasion of its recent comment on ocean rights and territorial sea limits to restate this claim or to formulate its position on key issues of the law of the sea. As for the Senkakus, Commentator argues on historical grounds that these islands, like Taiwan, "have been China's territories since ancient times" and are not subject to challenge; otherwise, Peking has not been explicit in setting forth its claims.

Chinese propaganda supporting the Latin American and other countries' claims vis-a-vis the superpowers has made a point of citing instances of opposition to efforts to define limits to the exercise of sovereignty. Peking has endorsed the right of Latin American countries to claim a 200-mile territorial sea limit, without defining the PRC's own claim; and in its reference to the draft treaty on arms control on the seabed, Peking mentioned the objection of Peru and other countries to the treaty's stipulation of a 12-mile limit on deployment of mass annihilation weapons on the seabed as an attempt by the superpowers to impose their views on restricting territorial waters to 12 miles. As its propaganda treatment of other countries' claims suggests, Peking is keeping its position open and flexible--apart from territorial claims on such areas as Taiwan and the Senkakus--in order to take account of geographical, geological, and biological conditions as well as the requirements of resource exploitation. The propaganda also reflects Peking's concern to get a hearing for its claims and to head off those trying to steal a march on exploitation of ocean resources while shelving issues of sovereignty.

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BACTERIAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE

MOSCOW CALLS ARMY ANNOUNCEMENT ON BW WEAPONS PROPAGANDA PLOY

Soviet media have given scant attention to the 18 December announcement that the U.S. Department of the Army will begin in early 1971 to implement plans for the destruction of its stockpile of bacteriological weapons, including toxins. A TASS report the following day dismissed the announcement as "another propaganda stratagem of the American military through which the Pentagon seeks to mislead American and world opinion."

The TASS report took note of the fact that the announcement came 13 months after President Nixon, "under the pressure" of public opinion, had stated his intention to liquidate the stocks of bacteriological weapons. TASS observed that the United States still has not ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical and bacteriological weapons. It added that "the development of biological weapons would be continued, as before, in Edgewood, Maryland, and in Dugway, Utah"---an apparent allusion to plans to maintain a small quantity of material for research on defenses against bacteriological agents.

A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 27th, like the TASS report, saw the decision to liquidate the bacteriological weapons stockpile as based on "political and propaganda calculations." It said that U.S. spokesmen have long argued, "especially during the disarmament talks," that bacteriological weapons would probably never be used because of their danger both to the enemy and to the side which might utilize them. Thus Washington, according to the commentary, "has made a gesture" in the direction of destroying them. On the other hand, the commentary added, the United States has "stubbornly refused" to destroy chemical weapons when it is "waging a real chemical war in Indochina." The 19 December TASS report had also taken note of the United States' utilization of gas in Vietnam "for the extermination of people" and use of defoliants and herbicides against crops and vegetation.

Moscow's reaction to the Army's announcement is in line with its attacks on the Administration's views on chemical and bacteriological weapons since November 1969, when President

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Nixon announced that he would seek Senate ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and that he had asked the Defense Department to submit proposals for destruction of the stockpile of bacteriological weapons.* Soviet propaganda last month on the anniversary of the President's announcement complained that "nothing has really changed." Comment in August had taken note of the President's delay of "more than half a year" in submitting his message to the Senate--on 19 August--asking for ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Some propaganda at that time additionally cited the U.S. disposal at sea of a stock of nerve gas, charging that the message was meant to "tone down" the protests over the dumping operation.

Moscow commentators have consistently belabored U.S.--as well as British--efforts at the Geneva disarmament talks and in the United Nations to separate chemical and bacteriological weapons, arguing that the aim is to permit the United States to continue its "chemical war" in Indochina.

* For a report on initial Soviet reaction to these announcements, see the TRENDS of 26 November 1969, pages 23-24.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

HARDLINER NAMED TO POST OF MOSCOW CITY CULTURE CHIEF

A 22 December session of the Moscow city soviet appointed B. V. Pokarzhevskiy chief of the Moscow city culture administration. Hardliner Pokarzhevskiy, first secretary of Sverdlovsk Raykom in Moscow, previously was critical of his predecessor B. Ye Rodionov's allegedly indulgent handling of dissident theater directors (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 February 1968, and SOVIET RUSSIA, 22 October 1968).*

Pokarzhevskiy, whose rayon contained most of the Moscow theaters, started a crackdown on liberal theater directors in February 1968 (SOVIET CULTURE, 24 February), which he later described in SOVIET RUSSIA (6 June 1968). Pokarzhevskiy's raykom bureau also officially censured liberal TEATR chief editor Yu. S. Rybakov (subsequently removed) and, condemning the "ideologically harmful works" in TEATR and NOVY MIR, ordered the party organizations of those journals to improve their journals' ideological work (SOVIET RUSSIA, 22 August 1968 and 22 October 1968).

The Moscow soviet session also named A. K. Melnichenko as successor to N. T. Sizov as Moscow city executive committee deputy chairman in charge of culture. Although Melnichenko has not revealed his ideological leanings in published articles, he is probably a hardliner, having been appointed head of the Moscow gorkom science and higher educational institutions section precisely when the theater crackdown began in February 1968. First Secretary of the Lenin raykom until the beginning of 1968, he first appeared in his post of section head on 16 March 1968 (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA) and was officially confirmed at the 29 March 1968 Moscow city party conference and plenum. This gathering heard Brezhnev and others attack the dissidents; in effect, it initiated the 1968 national cultural crackdown. In his most recent activity, Melnichenko spoke to a 26 November aktiv of university workers on improving the ideological education of students (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 November 1970).

* The removal of Rodionov and his chief N. T. Sizov was discussed in the 9 December FBIS TRENDS, p. 30.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

NFLSV ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE BY MILITARY LEADER, TRAN NAM TRUNG

Liberation Front media on 10 December began publicizing in installments an article by Tran Nam Trung* on lessons from the past 10 years of NFLSV experience which gives unusual prominence to the role of large units of the armed forces. The article reportedly was first published in a special issue of the paper QUAN GIAI PHONG (LIBERATION ARMED FORCES) marking the 10th anniversary of the founding of the NFLSV. It was summarized by LPA from 10 to 13 December and broadcast in a fuller version by Liberation Radio from the 10th to the 16th. Hanoi radio broadcast excerpts from it from the 16th to the 18th, and according to VNA it was published "in full" in all Hanoi papers on the 16th. Papers of that date are not yet available.

Communist media rarely publicize statements on the war attributed to Tran Nam Trung, although he regularly signs messages in his capacity as defense minister and he has occasionally been reported to have spoken at meetings. The only known substantial discussion of the war by Trung released in the last five years was a report he made in January 1968 to an enlarged session of the NFLSV Presidium, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 23 January.

BIG UNIT ENGAGEMENTS TERMED ESSENTIAL FOR FINAL VICTORY

In the course of his extrapolation of the lessons of the past 10 years of fighting, Trung gives attention to the role of "big units" that is unprecedented in Front propaganda for at least the past two years. Not content with a general

* Tran Nam Trung is given the usual identification of PRG defense minister and commander of the PLAF. The name Tran Nam Trung is presumed to be a pseudonym; it is known to have been used as an alias for two North Vietnamese generals-- Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra and Maj. Gen. Tran Luong.

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reaffirmation of the "law" that the development of guerrilla warfare must be accompanied by the "stepping up" of military actions by large units, Trung goes on to claim that the regular communist forces have "stepped up their big-unit attacks on an ever larger scale" and to suggest that such big-unit actions have played an important role even this year.* Trung maintains that the acceleration of big-unit actions poses a threat to the allies and aids the development of guerrilla warfare. He concludes that the stepping up of big-unit actions is "required in the development of the all-people and comprehensive people's war in order to smash the U.S. imperialists' stubborn plots and to crush their aggressive will."

It seems unlikely that Trung's article signals any immediate change in communist strategy since a major change in strategy would normally be reflected throughout the propaganda, not in a single article. However, Trung may be arguing for a specific action, perhaps outside South Vietnam. Later in the article he maintains that the "coordinated offensives" in Indochina have "created new offensive forces, new territories for offensives, and new abilities for large-scale offensives."

It is possible that the article is a manifestation of an ongoing debate, as a result of communist setbacks, over the course to be followed in the war. Such a debate seemed invited in a September 1970 report by DRV Defense Minister Giap which called for new contributions to military science to aid in conducting the war in the South.** The suggestion that new ideas about the war may be needed has been contained in other high-level Vietnamese statements--notably the lengthy February 1970

* NFLSV President Nguyen Huu Tho, in an interview published in the 25 December Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP and publicized by Hanoi and Front media, avoided responding directly to a question about the absence this year of battalion- or regimental-size battles. Tho merely repeated claims that the communists have inflicted serious losses on large allied units. Atypically, Front ambassador to Moscow Dang Quang Minh, in an interview in the 7 November NEW TIMES, acknowledged that there were no major battles in 1969-70.

** Giap's report, delivered to an army conference on military science, was published in the 30 and 31 October issues of the Hanoi papers. His report is discussed in the 13 November FBIS TRENDS Supplement on North Vietnam.

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article by First Secretary Le Puan which warned that a revolution can "mark time" or even "falter" because it "lacks an appropriate revolutionary method."

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